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"model" case of Israel, our Agency, 1993 Agency, -1994 Agency, 1993 Agency, -1994 2, 14), in 1993 these countries accounted for about 75% of global military expenditures and 92% of all arms exports, and, although armed conflicts and wars often occur in the developing world, the political and economic role of the industrialized countries is clearly paramount. How likely, then, are these countries to continue and reduce their military production and exports? The answer to this question is of course highly complex, yet one aspect looms large and that is the two-way interaction between arms production and business structure. Over time, military spending tends to affect the evolution of the corporate sector and alter the balance of power between its constituent components. These changes need not be significant of course, but when they are, one of their possible consequences is to augment the political clout of some of the affected groups, perhaps to the extent that they can then influence the course of military budgets and arms exports. Thus, any attempt to understand the development of military spending and, by extension, the prospect for future changes, should take into consideration these structural consequences of the war economy.
In this paper Theoretical and empirical attempts to deal with military spending are usually based on some explicit or implicit assumption regarding the underlying structure of society. One approach is to begin by assuming that the actions of a &dquo;nation&dquo; reflect some commonly shared set of interests. In this aggregate , framework, it is customary to subdivide society into two systems of &dquo;economics&dquo; and &dquo;politics.&dquo; The economic system, so it is assumed, would guarantee universal welfare if only it were allowed to function &dquo;efficiently.&dquo; The political system may undermine that efficiency when it seeks to achieve additional goals such as &dquo;national security&dquo; but fails to find the optimal rate of substitution between security and economic growth along the nation's production-possibility frontier. Seen from this perspective, military spending appears to be governed by politicians who are free to choose between a rational action toward &dquo;correct&dquo; decisions, or a passionate behavior leading to inevitable &dquo;mistakes.&dquo;~ The literature on defense economics in Israel is dominated almost exclusively by these presumptions and is preoccupied with the &dquo;optimal&dquo; choice between security and alternative economic goals. The seminal article by Berglas (1983) , for example, attempted to weigh the economic &dquo;burden&dquo; of military spending, while Sadan (1985) expanded the 1 The notion that politicians are indeed free to choose and hence tend to "err" is deeply embedded in the historical theories of Schumpeter (1919) and Tuchman (1984) . On the "mistake theory," see Barnet (1972: 7, 125 Hilferding (1910) , Luxemburg (1913) and Veblen (1904 and Veblen ( , 1923 tied the increase in military spending and the tendency toward aggressive foreign policy with the process of corporate concentration in advanced capitalist economies. Later writers, such as Kalecki (1971 Kalecki ( , 1972 , Steindl (1952) , and Baran and Sweezy (1966) Kalecki (1964 Kalecki ( , 1967 Bichler and Nitzan 1988 , and Levi 1979 Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1988) . The history of Israel's business elites and its relationship with the political and military elites is examined in Frenkel and Bichler (1984) . The interaction between the "big economy" and the government in Israel was first analyzed in Aharoni (1976 10 See, for instance, Ben-Porath (1986), Bruno (1989) and Sharkansky (1987) . An earlier analysis is given in Patinkin (1965) .
11 The "Sapir Method" and some of its important structural ramifications are examined in Barkai (1968) .
12 A parallel process of segmentation has been proposed by Farjoun (1978 Farjoun ( , 1980 Farjoun ( , 1983 , who described the growing dichotomy between the primary and secondary labor markets. With the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the concurrent militarization of the "big economy," writes Farjoun (1978: 4) (1984) and Frenkel and Bichler (1984). 16 Although the "militarization" of the Israeli economy and its broader political-economic implications have never been systematically analyzed in Israel, there are several works that need to be mentioned. Perhaps the most cited study, by Peri and Neubach (1985) , asserted that there exists in Israel a "military-industrial complex" along the lines proposed by Mills (1956) . Unfortunately, these authors provided no empirical evidence to substantiate their claim. Another article by Halperin (1987) where (bi) are unknown coefficients and u is an error term. Table 3 provides least-squares estimates for Equations (6), (7a) and (7b), as well as indicating the arithmetic unit sum for corresponding slope estimates in Equations (7a) and (7b).21
The results indicate that 9 of the 11 slope coefficients in the core's final Equation (7a) Farjoun ( 1978 Farjoun ( , 1980 Farjoun ( , 1983 Figure 3 .
In evaluating the historical picture emerging from these data, our concern is of course only with variations, not absolute magnitudes. (1973, 1978) , claimed that military expenditures have had a positive influence on economic growth, whereas those who concentrated more on the experience of developed economies, like Smith (1977 like Smith ( , 1978 like Smith ( , 1980 Indeed, if we could reverse the structural role of military and civilian production, making the former concentration-abating and the latter concentration-augmenting, we may be able to turn the Israeli &dquo;big economy&dquo; into the best ally of peace. Failing to move in this direction would then leave a constant temptation to revert back to rising military budgets.
